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Introduction
The Interagency Process (IAP), formally established in 1947, is in need of major overhaul. The present process for directing national strategic policy is open for interpretation by the executive branch, which has led to ineffective interagency proceedings, redundancy, and at times conflicting policy. As the nation prepares for the future, it is imperative that the IAP be better codified and formalized to enhance national strength and security. Over the past century and through many conflicts, the role of the U.S. military has changed from being a self-defense force to being a global force focused on a commitment to world peace and democracy. The evolution of the Services into a joint, unified fighting machine is a fascinating study of overcoming personalities, almost fanatical parochialism, and much debate on what is best for the nation. 2 The evolution of democratic principals and a global military presence makes it essential that the leaders of organizations involved in political and military intercourse fully recognize and understand the role of all departments and agencies of the U.S. Government as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational organizations.
The IAP applied during military contingency operations has been a topic of discussion and debate since its inception. Many studies have discussed the shortfalls of the IAP, and each administration has struggled to recognize and make use of lessons from previous conflicts. The IAP is a complicated process that must be fully understood and effectively executed to ensure positive conflict termination and transition to peace. The current process is the responsibility of the President and the National Security Council; however, the track record for managing a successful process has been marginal at best due primarily to a lack of accountability. The IAP structure provides a degree of executive privilege that sets it apart from the legislative branch, but weak or misplaced accountability erodes the IAP foundation. The result is often a process that lacks unity of command and undermines unity of effort. In addition, the current process is devoid of a long-standing organization that would facilitate standardization throughout changes in executive administrations. A change in legislation to redirect the IAP, including designating lead agencies for planning and execution of specific phases during operations, is needed for the U.S. Government to effectively reach its desired end states in future operations.
The model of the defense reorganization is a positive example of how legislative change can produce beneficial results in meeting the strategic needs of the nation. The military forces struggled to accomplish joint unity until mandated by Congressional legislation in the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. As the military was forced into joint integration, and has had to answer to Congress to verify compliance, perhaps the time has come for legislation mandating a solid, stable, and accountable IAP. Particularly important in the interagency process are conflict transition and termination, and the need to make the future IAP more accountable and therefore more likely to achieve an end state supporting the national interest.
Interagency Process Historical Perspective
The IAP has recently come under attack by many citing it as a major reason for the less than effective operations, most notably Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). According to Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the "Failure must be placed at the level of the NSC [National Security Council] and the president [sic] ." He also says, "We have to understand that it was the function of the NSC to insure that the interagency process worked." 3 For the IAP to function effectively to support the national interests in the future, it is necessary to find the root cause of problems within the process and take appropriate actions to correct them. A thorough review and analysis of the NSC structure is required to assess the authority vested in the executive branch in directing interagency interaction, and doing so may reveal national security policy shortfalls.
The National Security Act of July 26, 1947 (PL 235 -61 Military Establishment, and a National Security Resources Board. The NSC became the means by which each administration could formulate foreign policy and the means by which the Government Interagency views were coordinated. 6 Executive privilege was the intent of the security act, and perhaps is the reason that legislation regarding the NSC has not changed. Since the NSC was chartered each President has implemented the counsel using different approaches; therefore the function of the NSC has seen continual long-term change or an ebb and flow of responsibility.
The President has used various methods to establish and execute foreign policy using the NSC to greater or lesser degrees. Through the various legislative changes of the 1940s, an organization and process has been legislated by which the IAP should perform; however, the process does not hold anyone accountable, and the legislation is open to interpretation by the execu-tive branch, therefore prone to be ineffective. Accountability and responsibility need to be specified. The actual language of the National Security Act of 1947 states:
The function of the Council [NSC] shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
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The operative word is "advise." The NSC, by law, performs an advisory function. If the group is properly organized and employed, the role of the NSC in the advisory function could lead to the appropriate transition planning, thus achieving the desired end-state in an effective and efficient manner; however, that has generally not been the case. The role of the NSC should be changed from an advisory function to one of accountability for national security policy, which includes assigning lead agencies to various transitions of the instruments of national power.
Historical perspective of the National Security Council
During the Truman Administration (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) and Ford (1974 Ford ( -1977 In addition, a Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) functions as an interagency coordinator of trade policy. 10 Issues considered within the TPRG, as with the PCCs, flow through the NSC.
In theory, NSPD-1 describes a mechanism for successful execution of national policy by providing for interagency representation and a proper forum for recommendations on transition policy and planning, including who should be responsible and accountable before, during, and after transition. But in practice, the personalities and issues associated with those assigned to the functional areas result in a process that deviates from theory. Essentially IAP execution falls short of NSPD-1 by not assigning specific authority and responsibility to appropriate subject matter agencies for planning and execution of policy.
Regardless of the personalities, proper transition necessitates two major facets of responsibility and accountability. First "identify all agencies, departments, and organizations that are or should be involved in the operations." 11 Second, "define the desired end state and exit criteria" 
Operationalizing the IAP
The complexity of international policy and cooperation make it essential that the role of the interagency process be effective. Transition periods define the appropriate points for agencies with specific expertise to take a leading role or fall into a supporting role in the process and ultimately determine when the U.S. Government can consider that the end-state has been achieved. In some cases that could be years. During the process, unity of effort is the key to a successful IAP; however, unity of command cannot be neglected or else accountability will be unattainable. The balance of effort and accountability becomes more important as the operational complexity and number of interagency and multinational members increase. In either case a lead agent is needed during each phase for effective operations. That agent must coalesce the interagency expertise that does not reside in any single organization, and must phase capabilities together at the appropriate times while managing all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). What is needed is clarity, not strategic ambiguity; more unity of effort and unity of command instead of domineering command; and efficient yet effective use of resources, not working at cross-purposes to achieve the desired ends. 13 The Department of State is best suited to be legislatively assigned that role, since all other instruments of national power are used in supporting roles to achieve and maintain national security.
Obviously the President is ultimately responsible for U.S. actions, but realistically, execution accountability must be delegated. A case in point is the ongoing discussions regarding President Bush's State of the Union speech in which he referred to an African state as supporting
Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass destruction. 14 That appears to not be the case at the moment, but responsibility and accountability for the information in the statement is of concern.
Was the Central Intelligence Agency responsible for the information? The National Security Ad-viser's office? Or even the President? All had a role and some responsibility. But even admission of using inaccurate information, reported through national news media, by Director of the CIA George Tenet, and of failing to perform adequately by Deputy National Security Adviser
Hadley doesn't seem to be acceptable to some people. Ultimately the President is accountable and responsible for his statements; however, following that theorem to its logical conclusion, the President would have to do everything. That is unrealistic, for the roles of the leaders within the executive branch and the functions of the staff are essential in the process. Responsibility and delegating appropriate accountability are essential to the overall execution of national policy.
The President appoints for designated positions as executive agents key people who are responsible and accountable with legislative, judicial, and public checks and balances for maintaining democratic rule of governance.
If the individuals appointed to key positions do not perform to the standard expected by the country, then a review of the checks and balances (the process and the legislation) is necessary. When change is required, either changing the political process or legislating change can be used. Political pressure is usually short lived, because it changes with each new administration.
Legislation is a more enduring solution. Recent international events have exposed strengths and weakness in the current IAP which can be viewed as catalyst for change. Change to the IAP is necessary to provide an organization which is more accountable, less personality and politically motivated, and enhances unity of effort to achieve National Security Policy goals. 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom: IAP Shortfall and Priorities

IAP Shortcomings
In mid-2002, the U.S. Department of State accurately identified key problems threatening the success of Afghan reconstruction, but an IAP approach to correct these problems was not initiated. The Defense Department is not in the reconstruction business and therefore the plan is designed to fail as long as Defense leads non-Defense functions. In June, UN General Assembly members issued dire warnings that the lack of security, increasing opium production, and insufficient resources for reconstruction threatened Afghan recovery. At that session, U.S. Ambassa- Again, assigning a single department to an end-to-end task for which it is not designed leads to difficulties because of focus on priorities, personality interplay, and partisan decisions.
Although the original OEF plan was followed, the conditions in Afghanistan in August 2003 indicate the plan has not succeeded, and a new IAP for OEF is required. Increased Taliban activity, including raids against Afghan troops and police, terrorist attacks targeting aid workers, 23 and the capture of the Zobul province, 24 along with increased production of illicit drugs and a surge in organized crime, have undermined the stability of Afghanistan. 25 As a result, Taliban recruitment is on the rise and loyal Afghan troops are deserting due to lack of pay. 26 Currently, the main Afghan crisis areas are regional security, narcotics trafficking, and reconstruction. In these areas, the OEF lead agency, Defense, either is not the agency of expertise or views a non-U.S. entity as responsible. Obviously the shift in the priority to OIF has had a detrimental effect on OEF despite initial NSC emphasis on the IAP.
As in OEF, the Department of Defense has led the IAP in planning and executing OIF. Once more, the IAP can be seen as fundamentally flawed for its lack of unity of effort and lack of proper authority and accountability. Regardless of the justification for decapitating the Saddam Hussein regime and the outstanding military campaign that brought about its demise, the delegation of a single lead agent for all phases usurped the IAP, which executed policy based on inaccurate assumptions and intelligence that degraded relations with many allies, required billions of U.S. dollars alone to be committed monthly, directly degraded OEF's war on terrorism (which is the #1 priority), and, given growing terrorist attacks in Iraq and elsewhere, apparently provided a catalyst for possibly recruiting thousands to terrorist organizations worldwide OEF and OIF are the most current U.S. engagements, organized and executed differently, but having the same fundamental flaw that has increased cost, effort, and time. The military force application aspect of the IAP has worked well in OEF and worked in OIF despite the lack of broad international military support. In both operations, it appears that the post-military transition was weak to nonexistent, and could result in mission failure due to the priorities of the lead agent-namely, the Department of Defense. The organization of the IAP and accountable leadership vested in departments with appropriate expertise could have prevented the flaws and internal policy conflict that is apparent in those operations.
Redefining the IAP: Goldwater-Nichols as a model
In pursuing its international objectives, the United States must take into account the multiple and often competing intentions and interests of other governments and organizations, public opinion, Congress, and other US Government agencies, as well as resource constraints. The intersection of domestic and foreign issues has expanded to affect every American and involve virtually the entire US Government. Successful US foreign policy depends on recognizing the conditions that are likely to prevail in the new and evolving international context, including: Multiple conflicts, crises, and threats-many of them transnational-rather than a single overriding challenge, will continue to emerge and may increase in frequency. While these may be small or localized in nature, they will frequently have potential for wider impact. These challenges will require determination, resources, and time to resolve.
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-Department of State Strategic Plan (2000) Since the end of the Cold War, and most recently in OEF and OIF, increased interconnectivity and more complexity in foreign affairs brought about by the growth of globalism have caused the lines between warfighting and peacekeeping to become merged so that the role of the interagency process has become ever more important when moving through the various phases in policy execution. Historically, effective transition during conflict is at best neutral due to the differences in the politics, personalities, and organizational relationships between the Department of Defense and other agencies that function in the government.
During a National Defense University-sponsored symposium on Goldwater-Nichols legislation, participants turned to discussion of the Defense Department interagency coordination. Act, CJCS was made responsible for strategic planning, education in joint matters, and establishing joint doctrine to codify how the joint Services should work together. The Services retained the responsibility for manning, equipping, and training their respective forces, while the combatant commands were given increased authority for operations throughout the world.
Importance of Goldwater-Nichols
The importance of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation cannot be overstated, with the over- Lessons can be applied from the Goldwater-Nichols debates when discussing the IAP. At the heart of the problem lies a difference in culture and the personalities of the leaders of the various components of the IAP operating in an environment that is political and based on the desires of executive department policies. In addition, executive departments are often not focused on the national interests but on parochial department desires. When focused on conflict termination, the lack of a congruent policy delineating the functions and authority of the agencies involved in the transition planning leaves planners open to the potential for miscommunication, the whims of a strong-willed personality, or abdication of responsibility so as not to be held accountable should failure occur.
During the Congressional hearings debating the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization, there was much discussion that legislation was not required. The arguments of the DOD and Joint
Chiefs of Staff focused on the effect of the leadership working together to accomplish joint warfighting and provide the President with the best advice. However, the bottom line remained that the Service Chiefs were parochial and the result of the "joint" advice remained a product that was compromised to achieve consensus and did not necessarily lead to the best advice, resulting in an ineffective joint environment. Furthermore, the military organization before GoldwaterNichols legislation was prone to change based on the personalities and parochialism of the leaders, who were changing regularly. A lack of unity of command and unity of effort was the baseline for operations. 39 This strategy is in keeping with the traditional dictums of Clausewitz whose principals of strategy remain relevant today.
Conclusion
The effects of globalism and the rise of an interconnected, international society tighten the dynamics of the "remarkable trinity" linking the people, the commander and his army, and the government. 40 Many recent essays and addresses recognize the need for coherent and effective interagency cooperation. James Locher, the backbone for the Goldwater-Nichols legislation stated that "...the ability of the pentagon to execute assigned missions now depends to a greater extent on the contributions of other departments and agencies." 41 In light of the arguments that faced the supporters of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, perhaps the time has come to pursue similar actions dealing with the IAP. With the emphasis on rebuilding after conflict, it is imperative that the planning and execution across all agencies be united in effort and command to succeed. Clausewitz saw the intrinsic nature of the political and military union, as did Admiral Leighton Smith, U.S. Navy (Ret.), who saw the need for interagency reform in 1996 when he stated,
We had best sort out ways to improve the dialogue between the military and the political masters who will tell us to go, and the military and civil agencies, and the PVOs and NGOs, with whom we will work shoulder to shoulder on the front lines in sometimes difficult and dangerous environments. 42 As in the 1980s when the union of the joint Services could not be left to the leaders of the individual Services to master, today, the union of the interagency process likewise needs more formalized direction and guidance. A solid organizational structure of authority, interagency relationships, training and education, and solid liaison capacity is required to make the IAP more effective and provide solid direction for future generations. The result will yield better conflict termination and enhance the ability of the U.S. Government to conduct foreign policy.
The National Security Council is the natural place to vest the authority for the conduct of transition from military application to resumption of normal diplomacy. The Department of State is the logical agent to lead the post-conflict phase. "Not only does the Department of State's mission emphasize policy and operations more than programs, its scope of responsibility for the coordination of foreign affairs covers virtually every other US Government agency, often lacks specific legislative authorities, and involves the management of overseas missions." 43 DOS is uniquely positioned to play a lead role, but as stated earlier, often lacks the legislative authority to accomplish the mission.
Former CJCS General John Shalikashvili, U.S. Army, echoes the need for addressing the interagency process: "...
[I]n my view, the most important area for improvement...is the emergence of a broad reform movement focused on our national security structure and the entire interagency process." 44 He continues by stating:
[P]roblems in the interagency arena today remind me very much of the relationship among the services in 1986. We need an agreed-on, written-down, wellexercised organization and a set of procedures to bring the full capability of the Department of Defense and all other relevant government departments and agencies to bear on the complex crises to which future presidents might commit us.
